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Abstract
This study considers a Cournot duopoly model with a consumer-friendly firm and analyzes the
interplay between the strategic choice of abatement technology and the timing of government’s
commitment to the environmental policy. We show that the optimal emission tax under committed
policy regime is always higher than that under non-committed one, but both taxes can be higher
than marginal environmental damage when the consumer-friendliness is high enough. We also show
that the non-committed policy will induce not only more outputs and higher profits but also more
abatement and less emissions when the consumer-friendliness is high and the efficiency of abatement
technology is not so high. Thus, the emergence of a consumer-friendly firm might yield better
outcomes to both welfare and environmental quality without the commitment to the environmental
policy.
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1. Introduction
Recently, a large number of companies participated in fair trade or greenhouse gas reduction pro-
grams and issued various statements on corporate social responsibility (CSR) and outlined activities
in their annual reports.1 Due to the current expansion of CSR, many industries are characterized
by the co-existence of for-profit firms and not-for-profit firms. Thus, the heterogeneity of objectives5
among the firms emerges as an essential research topic in the literature.2
Numerous theoretical studies have formulated models for analyzing the CSR activities in different
competition models.3 In the fields of public economics and industrial organization, many studies
considered an oligopoly model where profit-maximizing firms compete with their rival firms that
adopt CSR activities. In particular, as one way of adopting CSR initiatives, they utilized consumer10
surplus as a proxy of CSR concern and define the objective of the firm as a combination of consumers
surplus and its profits. Thus, the firms put a higher weight on output in an oligopoly, which induces
rivals to reduce their output and thus profits can be higher for a firm which adopts CSR activities.4
For example, Lambertini and Tampieri (2015) and Garcia et al. (2018) show that the firm may
strategically use CSR initiative as a commitment to expand the outputs and thus the firm that15
adopts CSR obtains higher profits than its profit-seeking competitors and induces a higher level
of social welfare. However, these results put aside the environmental policy, which is becoming
an essential part of contemporary economies. In the presence of an environmental problem, firms
concern on CSR (and thus committing a higher output) might be neither profitable to the firms nor
desirable to the society.20
In the process of policy-making, on the other hand, the ability of a government to commit
credibly to an environmental policy has significant implications to support the superior welfare
properties associated with a committed policy. Due to the political reason, however, if the regulator
can not commit credibly to the stringency of the policy instrument, firms have strategic incentives
because the regulator has an ex-post possibility to ratchet up regulation.5 Petrakis and Xepapadeas25
(1999), Poyago-Theotoky and Teerasuwannajak (2002) and Moner-Colonques and Rubio (2015)
1See CSR trend report by PricewaterhouseCoopers (2010) and KPMG (2013, 2015).
2For example, Chirco et al. (2013), Matsumura and Ogawa (2014), Flores and Garcia (2016) and Cho and Lee
(2017) showed that behavioral heterogeneity may produce different market structure.
3In the CSR literature, see Goering (2012, 2014), Kopel and Brand (2012), Brand and Grothe (2013, 2015),
Nakamura (2014), Chang et al. (2014), Kopel (2015) and Matsumura and Ogawa (2014, 2017) among others.
4The approach that CSR concerns account for consumer surplus is very closely related to the literature on strategic
delegation and sales targets for managers in oligopolies, as suggested by Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Vickers (1985).
5See, for example, Gersbach and Glazer (1999), Requate and Unold (2003) and D’Amato and Dijkstra (2015) for
a commitment issue regarding environmental regulation.
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examined environmental taxation under the time inconsistency problem when the regulator is not
able to commit credibly and showed an interesting result that firms undertake increased abatement
activities generating less pollution, which might result in higher welfare. However, they concentrated
on the symmetric case of homogeneous objectives where both firms only maximize their profits under30
environmental policies. Thus, a symmetric equilibrium can produce the same incentive to ratchet
down regulation and increase profits and welfare under efficient abatement technology. In the present
paper, we complement and elucidate these works by examining the role of CSR that can play in
designing of environmental policy under asymmetric equilibrium.
In this paper, we consider a quantity-setting Cournot duopoly model with heterogeneous objec-35
tives between firms where a consumer-friendly firm competes with a for-profit firm. We then analyze
the interplay between the strategic choice of abatement technology and the timing of government’s
commitment to the environmental policy. In specific, we consider the ability of the environmental
regulator to commit credibly or not to an emission tax, and examine the properties of either commit-
ted or non-committed regime regarding environmental policy. In the former case of the committed40
policy regime, the regulator sets the emission tax then the firms, taking the tax rate as given, choose
abatement investment. In the latter case of the non-committed policy regime, firms first select their
abatement levels and then the regulator sets the emission tax. Thus, under the non-committed pol-
icy regime, when an emission tax is chosen firms would expect the regulator to change it after they
have determined their investment in abatement. We investigate this time-inconsistency problem in45
deciding environmental policy in the presence of a consumer-friendly firm.
The main findings we obtain are as follows: Regarding positive implications on emission taxes, we
show that the tax rate under the committed policy regime is always higher than that under the non-
committed one, but both emission taxes can be higher than marginal environmental damage when
the consumer-friendliness is high enough. It represents that the strategic incentive of innovation50
will ratchet down the regulator’s ex-post possibility to decide tax rate, which is dependent of the
strategic relation between the firms. In particular, as the concern on consumer surplus rises, a
consumer-friendly firm produces more outputs aggressively, which increases total outputs and total
emissions even under higher abatement levels. Thus, irrespective of policy regimes, the optimal
emission tax will be higher than Pigouvian level. This sharply contrasts to the previous result in the55
private market where firms have homogeneous payoffs under environmental taxation.6 Regarding
normative implications on the two policy regimes, we also show that the non-committed policy regime
6In the literature on environmental taxation, it is well-known that the optimal emission tax should be lower than
marginal environmental damage under oligopolistic competition. See Shaffer (1995) and Lee (1999) among others.
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can induce the firms to decide not only more outputs and higher profits but also more abatement
and less emissions than under the commitment when the consumer=friendliness is high and the
efficiency of abatement technology is not so high. Therefore, a consumer-friendly firm under the60
non-committed policy regime might yield better outcomes to the welfare and environmental quality
as well. It implies that the heterogeneity of objectives between the firms are significant in designing
of environmental policies.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we formulate a Cournot duopoly
model with a consumer-friendly firm having abatement technology. We analyze a committed and65
a non-committed policy regimes, respectively, in section 3 and 4. Finally, section 5 compares the
results and provide main findings. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. Model
We consider a quantity-setting Cournot duopoly model.7 One of the firms is a consumer-friendly
(CF) firm (hereafter referred to as firm 0) that cares for not only its profits but consumers surplus.70
The other is a for-profit (FP) firm (hereafter referred to as firm 1) that maximizes only its profits.
Firms sell homogeneous output, q0 > 0 and q1 > 0, respectively, at the market clearing price
p(Q) = 1 − Q where Q = q0 + q1. We assume that both firms have identical technologies and the
production cost function takes a quadratic form, c(qi) =
1
2q
2
i , i ∈ {0, 1}.
Production leads to pollution, ei > 0, but each firm can reduce pollution by undertaking abate-
ment activities. Suppose that firm i chooses pollution abatement level ai > 0. Then, the emission
level can be reduced to ei = qi−ai by investing an amount of (k2 )a2i in abatement, which is character-
ized by decreasing returns.8 Note that a lower value of k implies higher efficiency of the abatement
technology. To guarantee an interior solution in the analysis, we assume the followings:
k > k(θ) =
1
4(2− θ)
(√
400− 544θ + 248θ2 − 8θ3 + θ4 − (20− 20θ + θ2)
)
. (1)
Note that k(0) = 0 and k(θ) increases on θ75
The extent of environmental damage due to pollution by the industry is given by ED =
(
∑
i ei)
2
2 ,
where the marginal environmental damage is MED =
∑
i ei. The government imposes an envi-
ronmental tax on the emission level, for which the uniform tax rate is t. The total tax revenue is
T = t
∑
i ei.
7Our model could be extended to the oligopoly model without further insights gained.
8The particular choice of the end-of-pipe technology in the specification of the pollution generation process is made
for the sake of simplifying the analysis where there is no strategic effect under the committed regime.
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The profit of CF firm is given by pi0 = p · q0 − 12q20 − t · e0 − k2a20. We assume that the CF
firm maximizes profits plus a fraction of consumer surplus (CS). Thus, the payoff that CF firm
maximizes is as follows:
V0 = pi0 + θCS (2)
where CS = Q
2
2 . The parameter θ ∈ (0, 1) measures the degree of concern on consumer surplus that80
the CF firm has, which is exogenously given.
The FP firm seeks only for profit maximization:
pi1 = p · q1 − 1
2
q21 − t · e1 −
k
2
a21 (3)
The social welfare is the sum of consumer surplus, CS, the profits of both firms, pi0 + pi1, and
tax revenue, T , minus environmental damage, ED:
W = CS + pi0 + pi1 + T − ED (4)
We shall consider two alternative policy regimes, each featuring a three-stage game between
a welfare-maximizing regulator and firms, to examine the properties of either a committed or a
non-committed policy regime regarding environmental policy. In the former case of the committed
policy regime, the regulator sets the emission tax then the firms, taking the tax rate as given, choose85
abatement investment simultaneously and independently. In the latter case of the non-committed
policy regime, firms first select their abatement levels and then the regulator sets the emission tax.
Finally, in both regimes the firms select outputs in the third stage.
3. The committed policy regime
In the third stage firms 0 and 1 choose their outputs to maximize (2) and (3), respectively, given90
the emission tax rate, t. Using the first-order conditions we get the following equilibrium output
level of each firm and total outputs:
q0 =
(1− t)(2 + θ)
2(4− θ) , q1 =
(1− t)(2− θ)
2(4− θ) , Q =
2(1− t)
4− θ (5)
Note that each firm’s output decreases in the emission tax. Also if the concern on consumer surplus
rises, the CF firm is more aggressive and thus increases its output while the FP firm decreases the
output. However, the total outputs increases.95
In the second stage, firms choose abatement efforts to maximize their payoffs. Firm 0 chooses
a0 that maximizes (2) while firm 1 chooses a1 that maximizes (3). Solving these problems gives the
5
equilibrium abatement level as a function of the tax:
ai =
t
k
, i ∈ {0, 1} (6)
that defines a positive relationship between abatement and the emission tax. Note that there is no
strategic interaction between the firms.
In the first stage the government sets the emission tax that maximizes social welfare in (4).
Solving the first-order condition yields the optimal emission tax, which is given by9
tc =
k
(
8(4− θ) + k(2 + θ)2)
D
(7)
where D = k2
(
20 + θ2
)
+ 4k
(
32− 12θ + θ2) + 8(4 − θ)2 > 0. We employ superscript c to denote100
the equilibrium under the committed policy regime. From (7) the equilibrium output, abatement
and emission levels are obtained:
qc0 =
2(2 + k)(4− θ + k)(2 + θ)
D
qc1 =
2(2 + k)(4− θ + k)(2− θ)
D
ac0 = a
c
1 =
8(4− θ) + k(2 + θ)2
D
ec0 =
4k(5 + k) + 2
(
8 + 2k + k2
)
θ − (4 + 3k)θ2
D
ec1 =
4k(5 + k)− 2 (8 + 10k + k2) θ + (4 + k)θ2
D
(8)
In equilibrium under the committed policy regime, the CF firm’s output is larger than that of the
FP firm’s, but both firms make the same abatement effort; therefore the CF firm’s emission level
is also larger than its rival’s. Note that ∂q
c
0/∂θ > 0, ∂q
c
1/∂θ < 0 and ∂a
c
i/∂θ > 0, i ∈ {0, 1} for any105
θ ∈ (0, 1).
9Solving this problem gives the following first order condition: − dED
dt
= −(1 − Q(t)) dQ
dt
+
∑1
i=0 qi(t)
dqi
dt
+
k
∑1
i=0 ai(t)
dai
dt
where the left-hand side measures the marginal benefit of taxation that is given by the reduction in
environmental damages associated to an increase in the emission tax rate and the right-hand side the marginal cost
of taxation that has three components: the decrease in consumer surplus coming from the fall in output market,the
decrease in the output of each firm, the raise in investment costs all caused by an increase in the emission tax rate.
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Finally, we have the resulting profits of the firms, environmental damage and social welfare:
pic0 =
4(2 + k)2(4 + k − θ)2(2 + θ)(6− 5θ) + k (8(4− θ) + k(2 + θ)2)2
2D2
pic1 =
12(2 + k)2(4 + k − θ)2(2− θ)2 + k (8(4− θ) + k(2 + θ)2)2
2D2
MEDc =
2k
(
20 + 4k − 8θ − θ2)
D
EDc =
2k2
(
20 + 4k − 8θ − θ2)2
D2
W c =
(2 + k)(4k + (2− θ)(10 + θ))
D
(9)
Proposition 1. Under the committed policy regime, pic1 < pi
c
0 for any θ ∈ (0, 1).
It states that in equilibrium under the committed policy regime, the profit of CF firm is always
larger than that of FP firm because the CF firm is more aggressive in production, which induces
less production of FP firm.10110
Proposition 2. Under the committed policy regime:11
1. tc <>MED
c if θ<>2
(−1 +√2) ≈ 0.828;
2. ∂t
c
∂θ > 0 and
∂(MEDc−tc)
∂θ < 0 for any θ ∈ (0, 1);
3. ∂ED
c
∂θ > 0 and
∂W c
∂θ > 0 for any 0 < θ <
1
2
(
9−√65) ≈ 0.468 if k < k < 4−8θθ
Proposition 2.1 states that as like the results in the previous literature on the oligopoly model115
with emission tax, with a small degree of consumer-friendliness the emission tax under the committed
regime is lower than the marginal environmental damage.12 But the tax rate increases as θ increases
and thus, interestingly, the opposite result occurs with a high value of θ. Finally, Proposition 2.3
states that both welfare and environmental damage are simultaneously decreasing or increasing
depending on the values of θ and k. This result represents a typical trade off between welfare and120
environmental damage in the literature.
4. The non-committed policy regime
The last stage in production is the same as in the previous committed policy regime. In the
second stage, the regulator chooses the welfare maximizing emission tax taking as given the firms’
10For more discussion on this point, see Lambertini and Tampieri (2015) and Garcia et al. (2018).
11The proofs are provided in Appendix B with the comparable figures, instead of formal mathematics, if it is not
straightforward.
12For example, Shaffer (1995) and Lee (1999) examined the blockaded-entry and free-entry models, respectively,
and showed that the optimal emission tax might fall short of marginal environmental damage.
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abatement levels. The first order condition of this problem yields125
t =
(2 + θ)2 − 4(4− θ) (a0 + a1)
20 + θ2
(10)
This expression defines an inverse relationship between firms’ abatement investments and the
emission tax, that is, the regulator decreases the emission tax rate in response to an increase in
the firms’ abatement levels. Thus, firms can strategically use its choice of abatement to influence
taxation: by increasing investment in emission-reducing activities, the firms can expect a lower
emission tax. Also as the concern on consumer surplus increases, so does the emission tax.130
In the first stage, firms choose their abatement efforts taking into account how the regulator is
going to respond. Firm 0 chooses a0 that maximizes (2) while firm 1 chooses a1 that maximizes (3).
Solving these problems gives the following reaction functions:
a0 =
128 + 128θ + 4θ2 + 4θ3 + θ4 − 4 (68− 32θ + 9θ2 − θ3) a1
592− 208θ + 52θ2 − 8θ3 + k (20 + θ2)2
a1 =
128 + 32θ + 36θ2 + 4θ3 + θ4 − 4 (68− 8θ + θ2 − θ3) a0
592− 112θ + 20θ2 − 8θ3 + k (20 + θ2)2 (11)
Since the slope of the reaction functions is negative, abatement efforts are strategic substitutes.
This is in contrast to the commitment case where ∂ai/∂aj = 0. Solving the reaction functions we135
derive the following equilibrium abatement efforts:
anc0 =
4
(
512 + 864θ − 272θ2 + 36θ3 − 8θ4 − θ5)+ k (20 + θ2) (128 + 128θ + 4θ2 + 4θ3 + θ4)
N
anc1 =
4
(
512− 480θ + 272θ2 − 44θ3 + 8θ4 − θ5)+ k (20 + θ2) (128 + 32θ + 36θ2 + 4θ3 + θ4)
N
(12)
where N =
(
4(4− θ) + k (20 + θ2)) · H > H = 864 − 240θ + 56θ2 − 12θ3 + k (20 + θ2)2 > 0. We
also employ superscript nc to denote the equilibrium under the non-committed policy regime.
Proposition 3. Under the non-committed policy regime, anc0 > a
nc
1 for any θ ∈ (0, 1).
It states that CF firm is more aggressive in investing abatement technology, which induces a140
larger amount of total abatement under the non-committed policy regime. Note that ∂a
nc
0 /∂θ > 0
and ∂(a
nc
0 + a
nc
1 )/∂θ > 0 for any θ ∈ (0, 1).
The optimal emission tax is:
tnc =
k(2 + θ)2
(
20 + θ2
)− 4 (8− 12θ − 2θ2 + θ3)
H
(13)
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From (5) and (13) the equilibrium output and emission levels are obtained:
qnc0 =
2(2 + θ)
(
k
(
20 + θ2
)
+ 2
(
28− 2θ + θ2))
H
,
qnc1 =
2(2− θ) (k (20 + θ2)+ 2 (28− 2θ + θ2))
H
enc0 =
2k2(20+θ2)
2
(2+θ)+k(20+θ2)(160−16θ−12θ2−θ4)+4(384−704θ+176θ2−20θ3+4θ4+θ5)
N ,
enc1 =
2k2(2−θ)(20+θ2)2+k(20+θ2)(160−208θ−12θ2−8θ3−θ4)+4(384−256θ−80θ2+12θ3−4θ4+θ5)
N (14)
In equilibrium under the non-committed policy regime, the CF firm’s output and abatement
levels are larger than those of the FP firm. Thus, the emissions generated by the firms depend on θ145
and k.
Proposition 4. Under the non-committed policy regime, enc0 < e
nc
1 for any 0 < θ < θe ≈ 0.33 if
k < k < ke where ke(θ) satisfies that e
nc
0 (ke; θ) = e
nc
1 (ke; θ)
It states that the emissions generated by the CF firm can be less than those generated by the
FP firm if its consumer-friendliness is low and the efficiency of abatement technology is relatively150
high. Note that ∂q
nc
0 /∂θ > 0 and ∂q
nc
1 /∂θ < 0 for any θ ∈ (0, 1).
Finally, we have the resulting profits of the firms, environmental damage and social welfare:13
pinc0 =
ρ4(θ)k
4 + ρ3(θ)k
3 + ρ2(θ)k
2 + ρ1(θ)k + ρ0(θ)
2N2
,
pinc1 =
λ4(θ)k
4 + λ3(θ)k
3 + λ2(θ)k
2 + λ1(θ)k + λ0(θ)
2N2
,
MEDnc =
2
(
96− 96θ − 12θ2 − 4θ3 − θ4 + 4k (20 + θ2))
H
,
EDnc =
2
(
96− 96θ − 12θ2 − 4θ3 − θ4 + 4k (20 + θ2))2
H2
,
Wnc =
σ4(θ)k
4 + σ3(θ)k
3 + σ2(θ)k
2 + σ1(θ)k + σ0(θ)
N2
(15)
Proposition 5. Under the non-committed policy regime, pinc1 < pi
nc
0 if 0 < θ < θpi1s ≈ 0.9428
It states that in equilibrium under the non-committed policy regime, the profit of CF firm can
be larger than that of FP firm if the consumer-friendliness is not so high. It implies that concerning155
a certain portion of consumer surplus is beneficial to a CF firm irrespective of the timing of the
commitment to the environmental policy.
13For the sake of expositional convenience, we provide ρi(θ), λi(θ) and σi(θ) in Appendix A.
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Proposition 6. Under the non-committed policy regime:
1. tnc <>MED
nc if θ<>2
(−1 +√2) ≈ .828;
2. ∂t
nc
∂θ > 0 and
∂(MEDnc−tnc)
∂θ < 0 for any θ ∈ (0, 1);160
3. ∂MED
nc
∂θ < 0 and
∂EDnc
∂θ < 0 for any θ ∈ (0, 1);
4. ∂W
nc
∂θ > 0 for any 0 < θ < θWnc ≈ 0.489 if k < k < kWnc where kWnc(θ) satisfies that ∂W
nc
∂θ = 0
Propositions 6.1 states that with a small degree of consumer-friendliness the emission tax under
the non-committed policy regime is also lower than the marginal environmental damage. But the
tax rate increases as θ increases and thus the opposite occurs with a very high value of θ. This165
result is the same with that under the committed policy regime. However, Propositions 6.3 and 6.4
state that it is possible that welfare is increasing and environmental damage is decreasing with small
values of θ and k. This result sharply contrast to the result under the committed policy regime
where a trade off between welfare and environmental damage exists.
5. Comparing policy regimes170
In this section we provide comparisons between the committed and non-committed policy regimes
and summarize our findings in a number of propositions.
Proposition 7. tnc < tc for any θ ∈ (0, 1)
The committed emission tax is larger than the non-committed one. The intuition is as follows:
Under the non-committed policy regime, due to the time-inconsistency problem each firm has a175
strategic incentive to increase abatement in order to induce the regulator to impose a lower emission
tax subsequently. This aspect is absent when the regulator pre-commit to an emission tax.
Proposition 8.
1. qnc0 > q
c
0, q
nc
1 > q
c
1 and Q
nc > Qc for any θ ∈ (0, 1)
2. ac0 < a
nc
0 for any θ ∈ (0, 1) if k > max[k, ka0 ] where ka0(θ) satisfies that ac0(ka0 ; θ) = anc0 (ka0 ; θ)180
3. ac1 < a
nc
1 for any θ ∈ (0, 1) if k > ka1 where ka1(θ) satisfies that ac1(ka1 ; θ) = anc1 (ka1 ; θ)
4. ac0+a
c
1 < a
nc
0 +a
nc
1 for any θ ∈ (0, 1) if k > max[k, kaa] where kaa(θ) satisfies that ac0(kaa; θ)+
ac1(kaa; θ) = a
nc
0 (kaa; θ) + a
nc
1 (kaa; θ)
10
It states that compared to the committed policy regime, both firms increase not only outputs but
abatement investments under the non-commitment policy regime when the efficiency of abatement185
technology is relatively low.
Proposition 9.
1. pic0 < pi
nc
0 for any 0 < θ < θpi0 ≈ 0.7713 if k > max[k, kpi0 ] where kpi0(θ) satisfies that
pic0(kpi0 ; θ) = pi
nc
0 (kpi0 ; θ);
2. pic1 < pi
nc
1 for any θ ∈ (0, 1) if k > max[k, kpi1 ] where kpi1(θ) satisfies that pic1(kpi1 ; θ) =190
pinc1 (kpi1 ; θ).
It implies that both firms can earn higher profits under the non-committed policy regime when
the efficiency of abatement technology is relatively low.
Proposition 10.
1. ec0 + e
c
1 > e
nc
0 + e
nc
1 and ED
c > EDnc for any θED ≈ 0.4482 < θ < 1 if k > max[k, kED] where195
kED(θ) satisfies that e
c
0(kED; θ) + e
c
1(kED; θ) = e
nc
0 (kED; θ) + e
nc
1 (kED; θ);
2. W c < Wnc for any 0 < θ ≤ θW ≈ 0.568 if k > kW where kW (θ) satisfies that W c(kW ; θ) =
Wnc(kW ; θ).
Therefore, with large θ and high k the total emissions and thus environmental damage under
the non-committed policy regime are smaller than the commitment one. Furthermore, with small200
θ and high k the welfare under the non-committed policy regime is larger than the commitment
one. We can plot Figure 1a and 1b, and show the comparisons of environmental damage and welfare
between the two different policy regimes, respectively. We can also plot Figure 2 and show that
the non-committed policy regime might be better than the committed one, i.e., EDc > EDnc and
W c < Wnc.205
11
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(a) ED comparison
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(b) Welfare comparison
Figure 1: ED and Welfare Comparisons
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Figure 2: Commitment vs. Non-commitment
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6. Conclusion
We have considered CSR initiatives of the firms and examined the timing of government’s com-
mitment to the environmental tax policy. We have emphasized the heterogeneity of objectives
and its impact on the time inconsistency problem in which firms’ strategic decisions on produc-
tion and abatement activities might result in different welfare consequences. We have shown that210
the optimal emission tax under the committed policy regime is always higher than that under the
non-committed one, but both taxes can be higher than marginal environmental damage when the
consumer-friendliness is high enough. We also have shown that under the non-committed policy the
firms decide not only more outputs and higher profits but also more abatement and less emissions
when the consumer-friendliness is high and the efficiency of abatement technology is not so high.215
Therefore, the emergence of a consumer-friendly firm might yield better outcomes to the welfare and
environmental quality without the commitment to the environmental policy. These results show that
CSR initiatives can play a significant role in the design and implementation of environmental policy.
The importance of CSR needs to be further examined in some alternative settings under different
market structures to check the robustness of the results obtained in this paper. This has to be left220
for future research.
13
References
Brand, B., Grothe, M., 2013. A note on ’corporate social responsibility and marketing channel
coordination’. Research in Economics 67, 324–327.
Brand, B., Grothe, M., 2015. Social responsibility in a bilateral monopoly. Journal of Economics225
115, 275–289.
Chang, Y.M., Chen, H.Y., Wang, L.F.S., Wu, S.J., 2014. Corporate social responsibility and inter-
national competition: A welfare analysis. Review of International Economics 22, 625–638.
Chirco, A., Colombo, C., Scrimitore, M., 2013. Quantity competition, endogenous motives and
behavioral heterogeneity. Theory and Decision 74, 55–74.230
Cho, S., Lee, S.H., 2017. Subsidization policy on the social enterprise for the underprivileged. Korean
Economic Review 33, 153–178.
D’Amato, A., Dijkstra, B.R., 2015. Technology choice and environmental regulation under asym-
metric information. Resource and Energy Economics 41, 224 – 247.
Fershtman, C., Judd, K.L., 1987. Equilibrium incentives in oligopoly. The American Economic235
Review 77, 927.
Flores, D., Garcia, A., 2016. On the output and welfare effects of a non-profit firm in a mixed
duopoly: A generalization. Economic Systems 40, 631–637.
Garcia, A., Leal, M., Lee, S.H., 2018. Endogenous timing with a socially responsible firm. Working
paper, Chonnam National University.240
Gersbach, H., Glazer, A., 1999. Markets and regulatory hold-up problems. Journal of Environmental
Economics and Management 37, 151–164.
Goering, G.E., 2012. Corporate social responsibility and marketing channel coordination. Research
in Economics 66, 142 – 148.
Goering, G.E., 2014. The profit-maximizing case for corporate social responsibility in a bilateral245
monopoly. Managerial and Decision Economics 35, 493–499.
Kopel, M., 2015. Price and quantity contracts in a mixed duopoly with a socially concerned firm.
Managerial and Decision Economics 36, 559–566.
Kopel, M., Brand, B., 2012. Socially responsible firms and endogenous choice of strategic incentives.
Economic Modelling 29, 982 – 989.250
14
KPMG, 2013. International survey of corporate responsibility reporting 2015.
KPMG, 2015. International survey of corporate responsibility reporting 2015.
Lambertini, L., Tampieri, A., 2015. Incentives, performance and desirability of socially responsible
firms in a cournot oligopoly. Economic Modelling 50, 40 – 48.
Lee, S.H., 1999. Optimal taxation for polluting oligopolists with endogenous market structure.255
Journal of Regulatory Economics 15, 293–308.
Matsumura, T., Ogawa, A., 2014. Corporate social responsibility or payoff asymmetry? a study of
an endogenous timing game. Southern Economic Journal 81, 457–473.
Matsumura, T., Ogawa, A., 2017. Endogenous timing in mixed duopolies with externality. Australian
Economic Papers 56, 304–327.260
Moner-Colonques, R., Rubio, S., 2015. The timing of environmental policy in a duopolistic market.
Economia Agraria y Recursos Naturales 15, 11–40.
Nakamura, Y., 2014. Capacity choice in a duopoly with a consumer-friendly firm and an absolute
profit-maximizing firm. International Review of Economics and Finance 34, 105–117.
Petrakis, E., Xepapadeas, A., 1999. Does government precommitment promote environmental in-265
novation? In Environmental Regulation and Market Power: Competition, Time Consistency and
International Trade, Edward Elgar Publishing , 145–161.
Poyago-Theotoky, J., Teerasuwannajak, K., 2002. The timing of environmental policy: A note on
the role of product differentiation. Journal of Regulatory Economics 21, 305–316.
PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2010. Csr trends.270
Requate, T., Unold, W., 2003. Environmental policy incentives to adopt advanced abatement tech-
nology:: Will the true ranking please stand up? European Economic Review 47, 125 – 146.
Shaffer, S., 1995. Optimal linear taxation of polluting oligopolists. Journal of Regulatory Economics
7, 85–100.
Vickers, J., 1985. Strategic competition among the few-some recent developments in the economics275
of industry. Oxford Review of Economic Policy 1, 39–62.
15
Appendix A. The values of ρi, λi, and σi
ρ0(θ) ≡36438016−37486592θ+7356416θ2+2670592θ3−2543616θ4+940032θ5−188416θ6+25600θ7−1536θ8−128θ9
ρ1(θ) ≡16(7479296−5922816θ−239616θ2+821248θ3−510336θ4+157312θ5−35440θ6+5856θ7−512θ8+48θ9+5θ10)
ρ2(θ) ≡16(20+θ2)(416512−235264θ−67008θ2+36832θ3−18800θ4+3568θ5−788θ6+38θ7−8θ8−θ9)
ρ3(θ) ≡(20+θ2)2(142336−53248θ−31872θ2+8448θ3−3056θ4+608θ5−16θ6+8θ7+θ8)
ρ4(θ) ≡4(20+θ2)4(2+θ)(6−5θ)
λ0(θ) ≡128(4−θ)(71168−94848θ+49920θ2−15520θ3+4560θ4−928θ5+120θ6−16θ7+θ8)
λ1(θ) ≡16(7479296−10014720θ+5740544θ2−1939456θ3+618624θ4−144256θ5+25488θ6−4576θ7+480θ8−48θ9+5θ10)
λ2(θ) ≡16(20+θ2)(416512−465152θ+248640θ2−62624θ3+20496θ4−3312θ5+476θ6−82θ7−θ9)
λ3(θ) ≡(20+θ2)2(142336−136192θ+67456θ2−9728θ3+4880θ4−32θ5+112θ6+8θ7+θ8)
λ4(θ) ≡12(2−θ)2(20+θ2)4
σ0(θ) ≡32(4−θ)2(109056−38400θ+4352θ2−5760θ3−656θ4−352θ5−48θ6−8θ7−θ8)
σ1(θ) ≡16(11329536−7088128θ+1734656θ2−668672θ3+44288θ4−19392θ5+2352θ6+48θ7+184θ8+36θ9+3θ10+θ11)
σ2(θ) ≡2(20+θ2)(4990976−2054144θ+438272θ2−207872θ3−13376θ4−13760θ5−1328θ6−480θ7−52θ8−4θ9−θ10)
σ3(θ) ≡(20+θ2)2(214016−46080θ+15616θ2−5248θ3−336θ4−384θ5−40θ6−8θ7−θ8)
σ4(θ) ≡4(20+θ2)5
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